Education Study (ICCS), this paper investigates whether globalization can have an impact on adolescents' value orientations from an aggregate cross-national perspective. The results of two-level hierarchical linear models (HLM) refute the hyperglobalist thesis for the universal convergence of values as a result of globalization, i.e., more globalized countries are characterized by the declining relevance of traditional markers of identity (e.g., nationality and religion) and their replacement with values that are more democratic and tolerant. Rather, findings lend support to the skeptical and transformative theses that focus on the enduring influence of cultural traditions on adolescents' value systems. Adolescents' supports for democratic values and immigrant rights do not vary across countries in accordance with the level of globalization. The influence of a country's cultural tradition on adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, and gender equality persists, even after controlling for the effect of globalization. A supplementary analysis also reveals that what conditions the effect of globalization on adolescents' value orientations is economic development rather than democratic advancement.
Ⅰ. Introduction
Globalization is a contested concept. While some might point to the spread of modernization as a sign of globalization, a more nuanced analysis of globalization reveals that the interconnectedness of globalization is at the same time asymmetrical and unequal.
Economic collapses, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, terrorism, cultural and military imperialism, as well as awareness of and response to these challenges have all should be regarded as part of the processes of globalization. This double-sidedness of globalization necessitates a critical viewpoint to the current historical moment in which globalization is causing inevitable changes across nations. In this sense, Kellner (1998) argues that globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon "that involves different levels, flows, tensions, and conflicts, such that a trans-disciplinary social theory is necessary to capture its contours, dynamics, trajectories, problems, and possible futures" (Kellner, 1998, p. 24) .
Among diverse changes that globalization drives, the most important consideration for this article is the cultural one: can globalization create an "international regime" for democracy and human rights (Donnelly, 1986) by diffusing democratic culture and values around the world? In the existing literature, this cultural impact of globalization has received less attention than the economic and political aspects of globalization. While some authors have noted that globalization is associated with a shift away from traditional religious values toward values that are more democratic and tolerant (Castells, 1997; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997; Roberston, 1992) , only a few of them have empirically investigated such claim (e.g., Inglehart, 2000) . None of these studies, to my knowledge, have focused attention on whether globalization can bring systematic value changes in one's formative years-especially during adolescence, the period which the cultural influence of globalization has been known to be particularly salient. As Jensen (2003) notes, "…adolescents are at the forefront of globalization. Popular and media culture (television, movies, music, and the Internet) contribute to the rapid and extensive spread of ideas across cultures, and adolescents have more of an interest in popular and media culture than children or adults" (Jensen, 2003, p. 191) . Longitudinal research has also shown that value orientations shaped in adolescence remains relatively stable throughout one's lifetime (Inglehart, 1997; Sears, 1981) .
Using cross-national data on eight-grade adolescents surveyed in the 2009 International Civic and Citizenship Education Study (ICCS), this paper tests three theses that offer very different explanations regarding whether globalization can have an impact on adolescents' value orientations. The first explanation is the hyperglobalist thesis for the convergence of values across countries, emphasizing that more globalized countries are characterized by the declining relevance of traditional markers of identity (e.g., nationality and religion) and their replacement with values that are more democratic and tolerant. By contrast, the skeptical thesis claims that a country's cultural tradition exerts an independent influence on value orientations despite the forces of globalization. Additionally, the transformative thesis pays attention to how global and domestic factors, sometimes in interaction, mediate value changes in adolescence. The results of two-level hierarchical linear models (HLM) refute the hyperglobalist thesis, and lend support to the skeptical and transformative theses that focus on the enduring influence of cultural traditions on adolescents' value systems. Adolescents' supports for democratic values and immigrant rights do not vary across countries in accordance with the level of globalization. The influence of a country's cultural tradition on adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, and gender equality persists, even after controlling for the effect of globalization.
Ⅱ. Theoretical Frameworks

Three Perspectives on Globalization
Facing fundamental uncertainties wrought by globalization, past research has led to vigorous debates over theorizing globalization. In providing an overview of different perspectives on globalization, Held, McGrew, David, and Perraton (1999) distinguishes three main theoretical responses-hyperglobalist thesis, skeptical thesis, and transformative thesis.
The hyperglobalist thesis views globalization as "a new epoch of human history" (Held et al., 1999, p. 3), which is featured by the declining relevance of state sovereignty. For hyperglobalists, globalization denotes the emergence of a single global governance and the dissolution of local cultures and patterns of life (see, for example, Albrow, 1996; Cox, 1997; Luard, 1990; Ohmae, 1990 Ohmae, , 1995 Strange, 1996; Tomlinson, 1999; Waters, 1995) . That said, hyperglobalist scholars disagree over whether such convergent effects of globalization are good or bad. At one end are neo-liberal scholars, who have posited that globalization fosters desirable common goals worldwide by advancing free market economies, democratic governments, and the protection of human rights (e.g., Fukuyama, 1992; Sachs, 2006; Seita, 1997) . On the other end, there are scholars who have maintained a more cautious stance toward globalization and claimed that the increase of global connectedness has created and reinforced inequalities within and between countries (e.g., Gill, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002 Stiglitz, , 2007 .
The skeptical thesis, by contrast, sees globalization as a "myth" rather than a reality (Hirst, Thompson, & Bromley, 1996, pp. 2-4) . Contrary to the hyperglobalist argument for global convergence, this skeptical thesis contends that current international processes are more fragmented than globalized (Boyer & Drache, 1996; Gordon, 1999; Weiss, 1998) . For instance, skeptical authors believe that the growth of multinational corporations and international organizations does not mean that nation-states are no longer relevant for managing economic and political activities; such supranational systems are still tied primarily to their home states or regions (Allen & Thompson, 1997; Hirst et al., 1996; Ruigrok & Tulder, 1995) . In so doing, skeptical authors argue that, paradoxically, globalization reinforces the importance of traditional markers of identity associated with nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion in preserving national and cultural specifics (Krasner, 1999) . Globalization, in the skeptical view, is conceptualized as divergent national and regional responses to maintain their positions on the international stage, not as convergence to a universal paradigm of market capitalism and governance (Schmidt, 1999) .
Between these two extremes, the transformative thesis argues for a more accommodative stance toward globalization. Although the transformative thesis does not deny that globalization is a historically unprecedented phenomenon, unlike hyperglobalists, it makes no claims about the future trajectory of globalization (Castells, 1996; Giddens, 1990 Giddens, , 1999 Ruggie, 1993; Sassen, 1996; Scholte, 1993) . In contrast to the skeptical view where "nothing has really changed," the transformationalists highlight the "transforming" roles of national governments and old cleavages in an increasingly borderless world (Keohane, 2002; Rosenau, 1997) . For transformative authors, the processes of globalization seem much less determinate than assumed by the hyperglobalists and skeptics, because there is no single driving force behind globalization and its consequences are not yet fully determined (Hoogvelt, 1997; Mann, 1997) .
The intensification of global connectedness, in the transformationalist view, has changed the ways that local and global forces interact with one another, and both should adapt to new conditions brought by globalization.
Global Convergence versus the Persistence of Cultural Traditions
This study's primary focus is on the cultural impact of globalization-can globalization create an "international regime" for democracy and human rights (Donnelly, 1986) by brining systematic value changes during one's pre-adult formative years? The three perspectives on globalization noted above help formulate this article's hypotheses.
On the one hand, the hyperglobalists assume the convergence of values with the emergence of a global governance structure. As capitalism becomes an almost universal way of life, the hyperglobalist argument goes, rising income levels give rise to the convergence of fundamental values-deeply held beliefs about what is right and wrong-across countries towards liberal democratic values (e.g., support for democracy and human rights) (Seita, 1997) . More globalized countries are, it is argued, characterized by the declining relevance of traditional markers of identity such as nationality and religion and their replacement with values that are more democratic and tolerant (Castells, 1997; Meyer et al., 1997; Roberston, 1992) . In this sense, the hyperglobalist argument can be construed as a continuation of its modernization counterpart in the earlier part of the 20th century (Cheung, 2000) , which assumed that there is only one route of social progress, i.e., the modernization process that inevitably heads for some kind of the "Western" model (see, among others, Friedman, 1962; Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1959; Weiner, 1966) . Unarguably, both hyperglobalist and modernization debates revolve around the existence of the ultimate destiny of all humanity, and the suitability of the Western value system in non-Western societies. Based on such hyperglobalist argument for the convergence of values across countries, I formulate the first hypothesis as follows:
H. 1. Adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, democracy, and human rights vary across countries according to the level of globalization rather than according to their historically rooted cultural traditions. H 1. 1. The extent to which adolescents believe the importance of religion and nation-states in society is lower in more globalized societies than in less globalized societies. H 1. 2. The extent to which adolescents support democratic values, gender equality, and immigrant rights is higher in more globalized societies than in less globalized societies.
On the other hand, the skeptical thesis questions the inevitability of universal convergence of values as implied by the hyperglobalists. The skeptics takes a culturalist perspective that distinctive cultural traits endure over long periods of time and continue to shape societies' value systems (e.g., Zakaria, 1994) . The process of globalization, according to the skeptical view, has not been able to eradicate civilization diversity, far from increasing uniformity in the form of a universalization of "Western" liberal democracy. For instance, Huntington (1993 Huntington ( , 1996 argues that cultural heritages exert enduring influences on the political and social outlooks of the world population, irrespective of the forces of globalization. In doing so, he further distinguishes eight major human civilization or "cultural zones," such as Western Christianity, the Orthodox world, the Islamic world, the Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, and Latin American zones. Hence, the rise of "Asianization," or "Islamization" stands in sharp contrast with the converging trend of globalization, where "the very phrase 'world community' has become the euphemistic collective noun…to give global legitimacy to actions reflecting the interests of the United States and other Western powers" (Huntington, 1993, p. 39 ). As such, the skeptical view highlights cross-cultural value differences that persist in the face of globalization. This skeptical thesis is formulated in hypothesis two accordingly: H. 2. Adolescents' attitudes toward religion, nation-states, democracy, and human rights are influenced by their countries' historically rooted cultural traditions rather than by the level of globalization.
Lastly, the transformative perspective proposes a middle ground, that is, the coexistence of global convergence and cultural divergence of values in a stable equilibrium. In the transformative view, although globalization brings about systematic value changes across countries, cultural heritages simultaneously affect the way people understand the world and their place within it. For instance, in his later work on social trust and obligations in Confucian Asian countries, even Fukuyama (1995) acknowledged that "if democracy and capitalism work best when they are leavened with cultural traditions that arise from non-liberal sources, then it should be clear that modernity and tradition can coexist in a stable equilibrium for extended periods of time" (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 351 As a cross-sectional, cross-national dataset with individual adolescents as the unit of analysis, ICCS 2009 is the largest-scale international study on adolescents' perceptions of democracy and citizenship ever conducted, including 140,000 eight-grade adolescents, 62,000 teachers, and 5,300 school principals from 38 countries. Countries were selected for each analysis depending on the availability of relevant information on globalization (see Table 1 ). Seven countries which lacked information on adolescents' attitude toward the influence of religion in society (i.e., Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, and Mexico) were excluded from the corresponding analyses. Schulz, Ainley, and Fraillon (2011) 
Analytic approach
The two-level hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) approach and software were applied in this study (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002a) . I built five separate sets of two-level HLM models, one for each dependent variable, which treated adolescents as the first-level unit and countries as the second-level unit. In order to take into account the nested structure of data originated from the two-stage sampling framework, total student weights (TOTWGT) 1) were used at the individual-level (Level 1).
Before arriving at the final model, three intermediary models (Models 1 through 3) were created within each set of the outcome measures, whereby predictors were specified at Level 1 or Level 2 in an incremental fashion. By modeling these intermediary models, I was able to estimate the incremental variance explained by each of the variables of interest. Due to space limitations, only the final model (Model 4) is presented in this section. The individual-level equation predicts each outcome measure for an adolescent i in country j as follows:
1) The total student weight is equal to the inverse of the joint probability of selection for a particular student (i.e., the probability that school A and class B and student C are selected). where   represents the country average on the outcome measure for country j, controlling for all individual-level variables included in the model.   indicates a random effect which is unique to each individual adolescent.   through   represent the coefficients of individual-level variables described in the earlier section. All individual-level variables were centered around corresponding group means.
In the country-level equation, the coefficients derived from the individual-level equation serve as dependent variables as follows:
In this country-level equation, the intercept   was specified as varying across countries, while all other coefficients (i.e.,   through   ) were assumed to be constant. The intercept   (i.e., the country average on the outcome measure for country j) was predicted by the level of globalization and cultural traditions. To facilitate interpretation, each country-level variable was entered into the model centered around its corresponding grand means.
Ⅳ. Findings 1. Cross-country Difference in the Globalization Index Table 1 contains information on cross-country differences in the levels of globalization, democratic advancement, and economic development. Countries are arranged according to each country's cultural tradition, i.e., Protestant, Catholic, English-speaking, ex-communist, Latin American, Confucian, and Southeast Asian. Similarly, GDP per capita presents strong relationships with both the KOF globalization index (r = .701) and the Ernst & Young globalization index (r = .697). Although the causality of direction cannot be confirmed, this modest or strong correlations imply that globalization is linked with democratic advancement and economic development. In short, more globalized countries tend to be more democratically advanced and economically developed as well.
Effects of Cultural Traditions and Globalization on
Adolescents' Attitudes toward Religion, Nation-states, Democracy, and Human Rights Table 2 presents results from the first models as described in the Method section. These first models, which include no predictors at either the individual-level or country-level, provide useful preliminary information on how much variation in each of the outcome lies within and between countries. In particular, Table 2 shows the ML point estimates for the grand means, i.e., the averages of each outcome measure across countries, as well as the estimated values of the within-country variance and between-country variance. According to Raudenbush and Bryk (2002b) , I computed the intraclass correlation (ICC) to assess the proportion of variance that is due to between-country differences. Among countries whose Attitudes toward the influence of religion in society. As presented in the second column of numbers in Support for gender equality. The results of Models 2(a) and 2(b) in Table 6 show that the dummy variables of ex-Communist, Latin American, and Southeast Asian have negative and significant impacts on the support for gender equality measure. In other words, adolescents in ex-Communist, Latin American, and Southeast Asian countries are significantly less likely than their counterparts in Protestant countries to support gender equality, holding all other variables constant.
As presented in the fourth and fifth columns of numbers in Table 6 (see Models 3(a) and 3(b)), the two globalization variables exert positive and significant effects on the outcome. similarly situated counterparts in Thailand, holding all other variables constant. Comparing the between-country variance explained by the two globalization variables (i.e., 69.6% in Model 3(a) and 75.4% in Model 3(b)) and the between-country variance explained by the cultural variables (i.e., 87.6% in Model 3(a) and 88.6% in Model 3(b)) reveals that, again, the cultural variables are considered to have greater practical significance than the globalization variables.
Given that Netherlands and
As Models 4(a) and 4(b) in Table 6 )). Here, the combination of cultural and globalization explain less than 10% of the between-country variance in the outcome (i.e., 9.6% in Model 4(a) and 9.8% in Model 4(b)). In short, the findings are consistent with the skeptical hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), which argues that the degree to which adolescents support equal rights for immigrants are influenced by their countries'
historical-cultural traditions rather than by the degree of globalization.
A Supplementary Analysis
Earlier, I pointed out that more globalized countries tend to be more democratically This study's findings contradict the dominant neoliberal view that the homogenizing effect of globalization can transform "traditional" societies in a common direction, especially toward
Wester-style liberal democracy as "the endpoint of mankind's ideological evolution," or even "the final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1992) . Although globalization has its all-powerful force to make issues regarding democracy and human rights universal (Torres, 2002) , it does not necessarily mean that the forces of globalization turn world citizens into one giant, homogenous culture, thereby eroding local cultures and patterns of life. At the same time, however, adhering to an essentialist view of culture is not enough to better historical-cultural heritages (Schwartz, 2012) . For a more complete understanding of the cultural impact of globalization on adolescents' value systems, therefore, future research can benefit from time-series analysis that examines whether and how adolescents' worldviews has changed over time across countries with increasing globalization. 
Support for democratic values
Scaled index derived from questions regarding students' level of agreement (raging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree") with statements about what a society should be like: (1) Everyone should always have the right to express their opinions freely; (2) All people should have their social and political rights respected; (3) People should always be free to criticize the government publicly; (4) All citizens should have the right to elect their leaders freely; (5) People should be able to protest if they believe a law is unfair. Higher values denote greater support for democratic values.
Attitudes toward gender equality
Scaled index derived from questions regarding students' attitudes toward gender equality (raging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree"): (1) Men and women should have equal opportunities to take part in government; (2) Men and women should have the same rights in every way; (3) Women should stay out of politics; (4) When there are not many jobs available, men should have more right to a job than women ; (4) Men and women should get equal pay when they are doing the same jobs; (5) Men are better qualified to be political leaders than women. Higher values denote greater support for gender equality. 
Cultural traditions
Based on Huntington (1993) and (Inglehart and Baker (2000) ), six cultural traditions are distinguished: Historically Protestant, Historically Catholic, English-speaking, ex-Communist, Latin American, Confucian, and Southeast Asian.
<Appendix B> Correlations among globalization index, democracy index, and GDP per capita
(1) KOF index of globalization (2 
